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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants do not dispute that before a claim for permanent 
total disability can be made, the employee must prove an injury and 
a disability. Until a person becomes disabled he cannot 
successfully bring a claim for permanent total disability in the 
Industrial Commission; hence, disability is the last event to occur 
in the cause of action for permanent total disability. Because 
that is the last event necessary, Mr. Vigos could not file until it 
occurred. Furthermore, he could not have known of this cause of 
action on October 13, 1988, which was the date he fell. He did not 
learn that he was permanently totally disabled until years after 
the fall. That is when the statute should begin to run. 
Defendants fail to address Mr. Vigos' claim that his 
constitutional rights were violated because he had less than six 
years to file a claim from the occurrence of the last event, which 
was his disability. However, even if this court accepted the 
social security administration determination that Mr. Vigos was 
disabled on January 1, 1993, then he had until January 1, 1999 to 
file a claim. Defendants are punishing injured employees who act 
in good faith to return to the work force. Additionally, the 
defendants are taking away Mr. Vigos' only remedy before he had any 
practical opportunity to pursue it. 
Utah State Ins. Fund v. Dutson, 646 P.2d 707 (Utah 1982) 
applies to this case. Defendants claim that employees must file an 
application for hearing for every claim. However, if an employee 
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cooperates with the insurance carrier and never has a need to file 
a formal application for hearing until after the statute of 
limitations has run, then the Industrial Commission will never get 
jurisdiction over these cases. To adopt the defendants' position 
would have a chilling effect on cooperation between the parties 
undisputed claims. 
Defendants failed to dispute factual matters that were raised 
twice below. Now defendants decide they need to dispute those 
assertions and they cite to factual matters that are not part of 
the record. Defendants' action is contrary to well established law 
in Utah. Defendants also did not move this court to supplement the 
record. Therefore, this Court should strike the portions of 
defendants' briefs that rely on facts outside of the record. 
ARGUMENT 
REPLY POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANTS FAIL TO ADDRESS THE 
STATUTORY REQUIREMENT THAT AN INJURED 
EMPLOYEE MUST BE DISABLED BEFORE PERMANENT 
TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS CAN BE PAID THIS COURT 
CAN INFER DEFENDANTS CONCEDE THIS ISSUE 
A. UNTIL A PERSON BECOMES DISABLED HE CANNOT 
SUCCESSFULLY BRING A CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION: HENCE, 
DISABILITY IS THE LAST EVENT TO OCCUR IN THE 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY 
In applicant's first brief he asserted that there must be 
both, an accident and an injury, before an employee can claim 
workers' compensation benefits. Applicant also asserted that a 
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claim for permanent total disability has an additional element 
before an injured employee can obtain benefits: the employee must 
suffer both an injury and the inability to work after medical 
stabilization. In other words, the employee must also be disabled. 
The defendants did not address either of these assertions in their 
briefs. Consequently, this Court can infer that defendants concede 
these issues. 
Frankly, defendants cannot argue otherwise. Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-67(1) states: 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability 
caused by an industrial accident, the employee 
shall receive compensation as outlined in this 
section. Permanent total disability for 
purposes of this chapter requires a finding by 
the commission of total disability, as 
measured by the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security 
Administration under Title 2 0 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations as revised. (Emphasis 
added). 
Id. Nevertheless, defendants try to deny Mr. Vigos his benefits 
because they simply ignore this requirement. The Fund's assertion 
on page 16 of its brief is a prime example of this. Defendants 
claim, "[t]he Petitioner's injuries were apparent on the date of 
the accident." It is undisputed that Mr. Vigos was not permanently 
totally disabled on October 13, 1988. His permanent total 
disability did not manifest until years later. 
Defendants also make contradictory statements about when Mr. 
Vigos became disabled, thus highlighting a very important question 
of fact that the Industrial Commission never resolved. Defendants 
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statement that Mr. Vigos' injuries were "apparent" on October 13, 
1988 belies their following admissions: 1) that he applied for 
disability on January 24, 19941; 2) that Social Security 
Administration decided he was disabled on January 1, 1993; and, 3) 
that he was still working on October 25, 1994. (The Fund's brief, 
pp. 16 and 18). 
Not only does the Fund make statements that are inconsistent, 
but the Fund's brief and the Industrial Commission's brief are also 
at odds. Beginning on page 2 of the Industrial Commission's brief, 
the Commission sets forth the required "questions and evaluations 
to be made in sequence" for a claim of permanent total disability. 
The questions and evaluations are as follows: 
1. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial 
gainful activity? 
2. Does the claimant have a medically severe 
impairment? 
3. Does the severe impairment meet or equal 
the duration requirement in 20 CFR 404.15092, 
amended April 1, 1993, and the listed 
impairments in 2 0 CFR Subpart P Appendix 1, 
amended April 1, 1993? 
4. Does the impairment prevent the claimant 
from doing past relevant work? 
The Social Security Administration denied this application on June 14, 
1994. (R. 30) Mr. Vigos then asked for reconsideration on October 28, 1994, which 
was also denied. (R. 3 0) The second denial was not dated; however, presumably it 
was denied after the October 28, 1994 request. (R. 30) In following defendants' 
logic, when Mr. Vigos was denied social security disability benefits he could 
reasonably conclude that he also did not have a worker's compensation claim, either. 
2
 § 404.1509 states: 
How long the impairment must last. 
Unless your impairment is expected to result in death, it must have lasted or 
must be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. We call this 
the duration requirement. (Emphasis added). 
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5. Does the impairment prevent the claimant 
from doing any other work? 
Industrial Commission's brief, p. 2-3. It defies logic how Mr. 
Vigos' injuries "were apparent" on the day he fell when Mr. Vigos 
could not meet the above requirements for several years after 
October 13, 1988. Moreover, the Fund cites to the medical records 
that report Mr. Vigos was released to return to work on May 8f 1989 
without restrictions. (R. 207) The Fund also cites Dr. Erickson's 
report that states: 
While his areas of impairment mayf at least 
temporarily, limit his ability to function at 
the same level of intensity, speed, and acuity 
to which he was previously accustomed, he 
clearly continues to be a very bright, capable 
man, with many options for employment and 
enjoyable leisure pursuits. 
(R. 225) Mr. Vigos is at a loss as to how those two reports make 
his injury apparent on the day he fell. Clearly there is a 
question of fact as to whether Mr. Vigos could meet the disability 
test until after the statute of limitations had run3. Defendants' 
claim that Mr. Vigos knew of his injury on the day he fell is 
unsupported by the facts and is unpersuasive. 
B. DEFENDANTS DC) NOT UNDERSTAND LARSON 
In support of Mr. Vigos' claim he cited to Larson's Workmen's 
Compensation. §7 8.42(a). Defendants try to distinguish Mr. Vigos' 
Both the Fund and the Industrial Commission assert that in any claim 
for permanent total disability, where there is not an award from SSA, the Commission 
will apply its own independent judgment of whether an employee is disabled or not. 
If that is so, then the Social Security Administration determination that Mr. Vigos 
was disabled on January 1, 1993 is totally irrelevant. 
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case by claiming the statute cited in Larson is only a one year 
statute of limitation as opposed to a six year statute of 
limitation. Larson states: 
A rigid claims period may operate unfairly not only 
because the nature, seriousness, and work-connection of 
the injury could not reasonably be recognized by the 
claimant, or perhaps even by the claimant's doctor, but 
in many cases because the injury itself does not exist in 
compensable degree during the claims period. This latent 
or delayed injury problem presents in the sharpest relief 
the senselessness of uncompromising time periods. The 
classic illustration is that of the apparently trivial 
accident that matures into a disabling injury after the 
claim period has expired. A worker is struck in the eye 
by a metal chip, but both he and the company doctors 
dismiss the accident as a petty one and of course no 
claim is made, since there is no present injury or 
disability. Eighteen months later a cataract develops as 
the direct result of the accident. If the statute bars 
claims filed more than one year after the "accident," and 
if the court applies the statutory language with 
draconian literalism, the worker can never collect for 
the injury no matter how diligent he is: he cannot claim 
during the year, because no compensable injury exists; he 
cannot claim after the year, because the statute runs 
from the accident. (Emphasis added). 
Id. Defendants do not seem to understand that the language used by 
Larson applies to all "uncompromising time periods/" not just a one 
year time period. Larson then uses the facts of a one year statute 
of limitation as "[t]he classic illustration . . . ." Larson is 
criticizing every statute of limitation that has uncompromising 
time periods, not just a one year statute of limitations. 
Therefore, this Court should remand the case to the Industrial 
Commission and order it to determine when Mr. Vigos became 
disabled. Then from that date compute when the six year statute of 
limitations started. To rule otherwise leaves Mr. Vigos with no 
remedy at all. 
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REPLY POINT II 
DEFENDANTS DO NOT ADDRESS THE CLAIM OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION IF THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS IS SHORTENED. 
A, IF THE LAST EVENT FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY 
OCCURS ABOUT bVi YEARS AFTER THE INITIAL INJURY, THEN 
A CLAIMANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ARE VIOLATED 
IF HE HAS LESS THAN SIX YEARS TO FILE 
Defendants position violates Mr. Vigos' due process rights and 
his constitutional rights to the courts as provided in the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, §§7 and 11. Defendants claim that 
because Mr. Vigos applied for social security benefits on January 
24, 19944 he should have also applied for permanent total 
disability benefits. However, what is lacking in this argument is 
any discussion of footnote 4 in Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 
1993), wherein the Supreme Court stated: 
The effect of the four-year repose period differs with 
respect to causes of action that accrue before and after 
the four-year period. The statute of repose shortens the 
statute of limitations as to causes of action that accrue 
before the repose period expires. For example, when 
knowledge of the injury is acquired more than two years 
but less than four years after the act of malpractice, 
the repose period shortens the time in which a known 
action must be filed to less than the two-year statute of 
limitations. Thus, the nearer the end of the four-year 
period one acquires knowledge of the injury, the shorter 
the time one has to file an action. Conceivably one could 
be required under the statute to file an action the same 
day one learned of it. That might well raise significant 
Defendants also state, "The Petitioner also retained counsel to 
represent him at his social security disability proceedings where evidence of his 
industrial injury was presented." The Fund's brief, p. 19. What defendants fail 
to tell this Court is that Mr. Vigos did not retain counsel for that hearing until 
February, 1995. Presumably the hearing was after Mr. Vigos retained counsel for the 
hearing. 
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constitutional problems. (Cites omitted and emphasis 
added). 
Id, at 576. This was cited in applicant's first brief and 
defendants simply do not respond to it. This Court can reasonably 
infer from the defendants failure to respond to footnote 4 of the 
Lee v. Gaufin case, that defendants perceive the constitutional 
violation will result in applying the statute as defendants do. 
As shown above, defendants do not challenge Mr. Vigos' 
assertion that a claim for permanent total disability has an 
additional element of disability before an injured employee can 
obtain benefits. This is significant in Mr. Vigos' claim that the 
statute is a statute of repose. Mr. Vigos raised the issue that 
permanent total disability benefits are more akin to death benefits 
than other worker compensation benefits. Again, defendants failed 
to address this claim. 
In Hales v. Industrial Comm'n., 854 P.2d 537 (Utah App. 1993), 
the applicant claimed and the Industrial Commission agreed with the 
applicant and stated in its order, "that the statutory provision in 
section 35-1-68(2) violated the Utah Constitution's open courts 
provision by extinguishing [the applicant's] constitutional right 
to litigate a valid claim before [the applicant's] right to file 
that claim arose." This Court came to the same conclusion. Id. at 
542. That is exactly the issue in this case. Mr. Vigos' right to 
litigate his valid claim was extinguished before his right to file 
the claim arose. Even if the date of January 1, 1993 is accepted, 
then the cause of action did not accrue until then and the statute 
would not have expired until January 1, 1999. 
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Moreover, given a different set of facts the defendants' 
position would lead to inconsistent results. For example, if Mr. 
Vigos had filed for social security benefits on October 12, 1994, 
according to defendants logic, because he filed within the six 
years he is barred from filing for permanent total disability. 
However, what if Mr. Vigos had filed for social security on October 
15, 1994, one day after the statute had run? Because defendants 
failed to address this issue at all, it is unclear if they believe 
a claimant should be denied benefits. However, it can be presumed 
that defendants do not think they would have this defense. 
The only way that a person's constitutional rights can be 
protected for a permanent total disability claim when there is a 
delayed onset is to start the statute when the last event necessary 
to complete the cause of action happens. It is undisputed that the 
last event is when the employee is disabled. Even if this Court 
accepts the Social Security Administration's decision that Mr. 
Vigos was disabled on January 1, 1993, he still had until January 
1, 1999 to file. He filed well within that time. 
If this Court were to adopt the defendants' position, the 
Industrial Commission will be flooded with applications so that 
employees can preserve a possible claim regardless of the extent of 
the injury. This Court can take judicial notice that thousands of 
workers are injured each year in Utah. Every one of these people 
will be required to file a claim for permanent total disability 
within six years regardless of their medical and physical 
condition. 
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Additionally, this type of "draconian" application of the 
statute will have a chilling effect on injured workers who try to 
return to the work force. Defendants are punishing workers who 
attempt to stay in the work force instead of rewarding them for 
their good faith efforts. This would also fly in the face of Utah 
Code Ann. §35-10-1, et seq. (Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act). 
Although this statute was enacted after Mr. Vigos' fall and does 
not apply in this case, a decision by this Court that concurs with 
defendants will have a tremendous impact on this statute. In §35-
10-2 the intent of this statute is to "promote and monitor the 
state's and the employer's capacity to assist the injured worker in 
returning to the work force as quickly as possible and to evaluate 
the cost effectiveness of the program." Id. (emphasis added). 
Because defendant's are punishing employees who are trying to get 
back into the work force, many will chose not to return. 
B. MR. VIGOS ACTED WITH DUE DILIGENCE 
Defendants argue that this case in more like Avis v. Board of 
Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 837 P.2d 584, 588 (Utah App. 1992) and 
Middlestadt v. Industrial Comm'n, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993). 
However, in those cases, the employee knew he or she had an injury, 
the employee was not totally disabled, and there was no delayed 
onset of the injury. This Court stated in Avis., " [t]he workers' 
compensation statute, however, does not require stabilization 
before filing for benefits." Avis, 837 P.2d at 588. However, Mr. 
Vigos had stabilized and returned to work. In his mind Mr. Vigos 
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did not have any additional claims to file for until years later. 
The workers' compensation statute for permanent total disability, 
"requires a finding by the commission of total disability, as 
measured by the substance of the sequential decision-making process 
of the Social Security Administration under Title 2 0 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations as revised." (Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67(1) 
emphasis added)5. As shown in Reply Point I, disability means the 
applicant is not gainfully employed and cannot or will not be for 
12 consecutive months. 
This case is more like Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 
1981), which this Court cited in Avis. In Myers the district court 
dismissed the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations. 
The Utah Supreme Court accepted plaintiffs' claim that they acted 
with "due diligence" in trying to discover the whereabouts of the 
decedent. _ld. at 87. The Court also concluded that the defendant 
could not establish that he was prejudiced by having to defend the 
stale claim. Id. The Court went on to say: 
In contrast, plaintiffs could not file an 
action for damages or even initiate 
investigative efforts to determine the cause 
of a death of which they had no knowledge. 
Plaintiffs therefore had no alternative other 
than to bring their action after the statutory 
limitation period had expired. If plaintiffs 
are denied the opportunity of proceeding with 
It could be argued that the language of this statute requires the 
Commission to make a finding on every claim for permanent total disability to 
determine if the claimant is disabled before the statute of limitation's defense is 
addressed Such a reading of the statute would be consistent with applicant's 
position because, if the claimant is disabled, the Commission could then determine 
when the applicant became disabled The applicant would then have six years from 
that date to file a claim. If the claim was filed beyond that time and the 
defendant properly raised the affirmative defense that the claim was filed after the 
statute of limitations had run, then the claim could be dismissed 
11 
that action, the law would be in the untenable 
position of having created a remedy for 
plaintiffs and then barring them from 
exercising it before they had any practical 
opportunity to do so, (Emphasis added). 
Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the Myers case had 
appropriate circumstances to apply the "exceptional 'discovery 
rule'" and concluded that the cause of action did not accrue until 
plaintiffs discovered the death, so long as they were able to prove 
"due diligence"6. Id. 
In the present case, Mr. Vigos claimed defendants were not 
prejudiced in this case, and the defendants, again, did not 
respond. Furthermore, the Industrial Commission's decision creates 
"the untenable position of having created a remedy for [the 
applicant] and then barring [him] from exercising it before [he] 
had any practical opportunity to do so." :id. (Emphasis added). 
In footnote 8, of Myers, the Court states, "[t]his is not a 
case where the fact of death was known but the cause of the fatal 
accident was not." Ld. The present case is analogous because Mr. 
Vigos did not know the fact of his disability until years later. 
If this Court affirms the Commission's decision in this case, 
it would take away Mr. Vigos' only remedy in violation of his 
constitutional rights. Therefore, this Court must remand this case 
and rule that Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99 is unconstitutional and, 
thereby, allow Mr. Vigos to pursue his benefits. 
The Court remanded the case to the district court and stated, "[a]11 
we hold here is that it was improper for the trial court to dismiss plaintiff's 
action on the pleadings on the basis of the statute of limitations." Myers v. 
McDonald, 635, P. 2d at 87. The Court directed the lower court to allow the 
Plaintiffs to prove they had acted with due diligence. Id. 
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REPLY POINT III 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION ONCE 
THE EMPLOYEE 1) REPORTS AN INJURY TO THE 
EMPLOYER AND THE COMMISSION AND 2) HE MAKES A 
CLAIM. 
Defendants try to argue that Utah State Ins, Fund v. Dutson, 
646 P.2d 707 (Utah 1982), is not applicable because it interprets 
different statutes. As can be seen in Mr. Vigos' first brief, that 
was acknowledged. However, the new language in those statutes did 
not overrule Dutson. Consequently, Dutson is still good law. It 
also applies to this case. 
What the Supreme Court stated in Dutson, is that an employee 
must do two things: first, give notice to the parties and the 
Commission of the material facts and, second, make a claim. If an 
employee only gives notice of an injury and makes no claim for 
benefits, then there is no jurisdiction. If an employee was 
injured and simply notified the employer of the injury, but made no 
claim, eventhough he knew he had a claim, then the Commission has 
no jurisdiction. The Commission also could not "modify" the 
injured employee's benefits because it has no jurisdiction. 
Contrary to defendants claim, Mr. Vigos does not totally 
disregarded §35-1-78(3), which states that the Commission cannot 
modify statutes of limitations. Mr. Vigos does not even suggest 
such a position. If a timely claim has been filed, then Commission 
has jurisdiction and the statute of limitations does not apply. On 
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the other hand, if an injured employee fails to timely file a 
claim, then the Commission does not have jurisdiction. 
However, if an employee was injured, gave notice to the 
employer and the Industrial Commission and made a claim for 
benefits, then the Commission has jurisdiction over that injury. 
This is consistent with Stoker v. Workers' Compensation Fund of 
Utah 889 P.2d 409 (Utah 1994), wherein the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
Nevertheless, Stoker may still have a remedy 
under the Act. It would be ironic for the Act 
to be construed in such a fashion that a 
worker who undertakes a conservative course of 
therapy within the time allowed by the 
statute, which if effective would save the 
Fund money and be less risky to the worker, 
would be denied benefits when that course 
proves ineffective and a more aggressive 
therapy must then be pursued, resulting in 
temporary total disability that occurs outside 
the eight-year period. Had the more aggressive 
therapy been undertaken at the time of the 
less aggressive therapy, Stoker would have met 
the requirements for additional total 
disability benefits. 
Id. at 412. The Supreme Court then concluded that even though it 
was more than eight years post injury, the Commission had 
continuing jurisdiction and Stoker could file a claim under §35-1-
78(1). Additionally, in Sheppick v. Albertson's, Inc. 2 97 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah 1996), in footnote 2, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
The provision granting the Commission 
continuing jurisdiction emphasizes the 
exclusivity of the Commission's jurisdiction 
over workers' compensation claims. Under 
general common law doctrine, the entry of a 
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judgment for damages based on personal 
injuries would bar subsequent actions based on 
the same injury. Such is not the case under 
the Act. The Commission is empowered to adjust 
the award in accordance with changes in 
circumstances. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78. 
Such changes could include a deterioration of 
the former employee's condition or the 
discovery of a previously unnoticed injury. 
See, e.g., Stoker v. Workers' Compensation 
Fund, 889 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1994) 
(commission can reopen case if previously used 
conservative method of treatment proved 
ineffective); Barber Asphalt Corp. v. 
Industrial ComnTn, 103 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 266 
(1943) (commission may reconsider case if 
there has been some new development that 
suggests award may have been excessive or 
inadequate); Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 60 Utah 553, 210 P. 611 
(1922) (commission authorized to alter award 
when amputated leg failed to heal sufficiently 
to use prosthesis). (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 14. 
In the Workers' Compensation Rules, the Industrial Commission 
has provided a form called, "Claim for Protection of Rights - Form 
002." R568-1-3(F). The Commission states that that form is to be, 
"[u]sed by an injured employee for the sole purpose of protecting 
his/her rights even though a dispute does not exist. Copies are 
forwarded to all parties concerned. NOTE: THIS FORM DOES NOT NEED 
TO BE FILED WHEN ANY OTHER APPLICATION HAS BEEN FILED." (Uppercase 
in the original and emphasis added). Clearly the Industrial 
Commission recognizes that an application for any claim gives the 
Industrial Commission jurisdiction over all subsequent claims. 
When an insurance company and an injured employee are 
cooperating the employee has no need to file a formal application 
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for hearing. That is why Dutson is still good law and applies to 
this case. How would the Industrial Commission ever get 
jurisdiction in a case where the employer and the employee are 
cooperating for a full six years? The defendants' position would 
require the applicant to file a formal application for hearing on 
every case, regardless of the cooperation between the parties. 
This is contrary to Utah law. see Stoker. 889 P.2d 409. In fact, 
defendants position would have a chilling effect on any cooperation 
because, according to defendants, the Industrial Commission does 
not have jurisdiction unless an employee files an application for 
hearing for every claim. 
Furthermore, the public policy considerations for giving the 
Industrial Commission continuing jurisdiction are also very 
compelling. If this Court adopts the defendants' position, then an 
employer or its insurance company can string an injured employee 
along until after the six year statute of limitations has run. 
This can be done in good or bad faith. For example, the employer 
could provide a severally injured employee a light duty job and 
conservative treatment. At the end of six years it could terminate 
the employee. Pursuant to Savage v. Educators Insurance Co., 908 
P.2d 862 (Utah 1995) an applicant has no recourse for bad faith in 
a workers' compensation claim, unless there is privity of contract. 
Therefore, the insurance company has no liability because the 
Industrial Commission has no jurisdiction. The employee has no 
recourse because he trusted the insurance company. 
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The defendants' callous interpretation of the statute goes far 
beyond the well established law of Utah concerning the purpose of 
the Worker's Compensation Act. In Norton v. The Industrial 
Comm'n., 728 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court stated, 
"[i]t need not be restated at great length that the Workmen' s 
Compensation Act is to be liberally construed and that any doubt 
respective the right of compensation will be resolved in favor of 
the injured employee." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the 
Commission has continuing jurisdiction in this case or else the 
statute will be construed so narrowly that Mr. Vigos will be left 
with no remedy. 
REPLY POINT IV 
PORTIONS OF DEFENDANTS'S BRIEFS MUST BE 
STRICKEN BECAUSE THEY CITE TO FACTS THAT ARE 
NOT PART OF THE RECORD. 
Last ly , the I n d u s t r i a l Commission has f i l ed a br ief in t h i s 
matter and has at tached to t h a t br ief several items t h a t are not 
included in the record. The Commission's br ief i s based almost 
e n t i r e l y on these addi t iona l fac t s 7 . The Fund s t a t e s in i t s br ief , 
" a l l re levant fac ts in the Bradley case are addressed in the 
In fact, applicant's attorney could not find one citation to the record 
in the entire brief. 
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Industrial Commission's brief." The Fund's brief, p. 11. The 
defendants failed to move this Court to supplement the record. 
It is well settled in Utah that, "[e]vidence not available to 
the trial judge cannot be added to the record on appeal . . . ." 
Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 
App. 1989). In State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d 995, 1005, (Utah App. 
1992) (Bench, P.J., dissenting), Judge Bench stated, "Our duty is 
to review the findings actually made by the trial court, not to 
make our own findings." Id. For what ever reason, the defendants 
have decided to wait until now to dispute factual matters that were 
raised twice below.8 (R. 47-8 and 68-9.) Therefore, this Court 
should strike the portions of defendants' briefs that rely on facts 
outside of the record. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants do not dispute that the last event necessary for a 
claim for permanent total disability to accrue is that the employee 
must be disabled. Defendants' claim that Mr. Vigos was aware of 
his injury on October 13, 1988 contradicts their admissions that 
Mr. Vigos applied for disability on January 24, 1994; that the 
Social Security Administration determined him to be disabled on 
Applicant's counsel takes offense at defendants' statement that 
applicant's counsel "misleads this Court by failing to provide the complete facts 
in Bradley . . . ." The Fund's brief, p. 11. Applicant's counsel made those 
factual claims in good faith and based upon his honest and best recollection of the 
Bradley case. Defendants were put on notice when applicant's attorney argued the 
same facts on two prior occasions in this case, first to the ALJ and then to the 
Commission. (R. 47-8 and 67-8) Defendants should have raised their contested facts 
below to make them part of the record. To now dispute the facts, and at the same 
time, question applicant's counsel's integrity is completely inappropriate. 
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January 1, 1993; that he was still employed on October 25, 1994; 
and, that he was released to return to work on May 8, 1989 without 
any restrictions. Mr. Vigos did not know his claim had accrued 
until he was disabled. That is when the statute of limitations 
should have started to run. 
If the statute started to run on October 13, 1988 then the 
statute is a statute of repose because it extinguished Mr. Vigos' 
constitutional right to litigate a valid claim before his right to 
file that claim arose. At a minimum it reduced the statute by 
several years, which also is a violation of his constitutional 
rights. 
If the Industrial Commission does not have continuing 
jurisdiction, then the Industrial Commission will never have 
jurisdiction over cases where the insurance company and the 
employee cooperate for six years. Even if the insurance company 
does so in bad faith, the employee is left with no remedy, simply 
because he or she cooperated with the insurance company instead of 
filing for a claim. Alternatively, the Industrial Commission will 
be deluged with claims even for the slightest of injury, simply to 
preserve any potential claims. 
Lastly, the Industrial Commission filed a brief that contains 
facts not in the record. Both defendants rely on these facts; yet, 
neither defendant filed a motion to supplement the record. 
Consequently, this Court should strike any portions of the briefs 
that rely on those facts. 
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Therefore, this Court should rule that the statute of 
limitations started to run on the day that Mr. Vigos became 
permanently totally disabled. Because there is a question of fact 
as to when that occurred, this Court should remand it back to the 
Industrial Commission. Alternatively, if the statute began to run 
on October 13, 1988, then this Court should rule that the statute 
is a statute of repose because it begins to run before the last 
event necessary to bring a claim and by so doing deprives Mr. Vigos 
of his constitutional right to pursue his claim. Alternatively, 
this Court should rule that the Industrial Commission has 
continuing jurisdiction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 6th day of November, 1996. 
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